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Pay What You Like
Abstract. We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product
allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never
free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under
certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further, for the seller this pricing
could be more protable than uniform pricing. If consumers consider the social cost
of free riding, or not paying a fair price, then our results show that consumers,
rather than free riding, may not opt for this option. Instead, they prefer to purchase
the good at the market price from a price-setting rm.
Keywords: pay-what-you-like pricing, self-selection, multidimensional screening, buf-
fet pricing.
1 Introduction
Pay-what-you-like pricing is a quite unusual strategy where consumers can pay what
they like, including zero, for a product the rm sells. The rm cannot refuse the price
paid by the consumer. We provide a theoretical model of consumer behavior under
this pricing to explain: how much consumers are willing to contribute; and, when this
type of pricing becomes protable for the rm? Our model shows that all consumers
free riding is never an equilibrium when the product provides a positive value; and,
under certain conditions, this pricing provides a larger prot than uniform pricing.
Historically, pay-what-you-like (PWYL) pricing has existed in other countries,
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especially for certain types of services. In most Indian villages, the village priest
accepts whatever the host pays for many ceremonies he performs such as naming
a newborn, performing a marriage, or other religious services, a tradition that still
continues. Doctors in rural India are still paid based on how much a patient can
a¤ord. In the United States, it is common place to observe church parishioners
practicing PWYL pricing when providing contributions (donations) to the church in
support of the services/programs o¤ered by the church.
More recently, PWYL pricing has been used by providers of services such as
entertainment, media, and restaurants. The band Radiohead o¤ered the download
of their album, In Rainbows to consumers with a pay-what-you-like option. Between
October 1-29, 2007, 1.2 million people worldwide visited the website and among
those who downloaded the album, 38 percent worldwide and 40 percent in the U.S.,
willingly paid. Free-riders were as prevalent in the U.S. as in the rest of the world, but
in the U.S. a paying customer paid $8.05 compared to $4.64 paid by his international
counterpart.1 Following Radiohead, the publisher of PASTE magazine also adopted
the same policy where subscribers can pay what they like for a years subscription of
the magazine. In 2005, the New Yorker magazine reported that a restaurant, Babu,
in the Village, a quite popular place for both the visitors and the residents of New
1 See http://www.inrainbows.com; and http://comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1883;
and the Wall Street Journal, October 3, 2007, p.C14.
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York City, where for some time the menu was without any price after nishing
their meals consumers paid what they liked.2 What turned out to be interesting
was that most consumers did pay, and some paid considerably more than what the
owner had expected, but there were also a few cases of free riders.3 Eventually,
the owner did switch to a menu with listed prices. On the other hand, a small
(maximum capacity of about 10 people) and exclusive Japanese restaurant, Mon
Cheri, in an expensive area of Fukuoka City, Japan, has consistently maintained the
PWYL pricing for dinners, since 1979. A small and intimate environment of this
restaurant with personal interactions has attracted many loyal patrons over a long
period of time. Perhaps, these two factors are reasons for the sustained use of this
form of pricing practice.4
Most recently, Kim, Natter and Spann (2009) in a rst empirical study provide
evidence on PWYL pricing. Based on three eld studies in Germany, the authors
report several interesting ndings about consumersresponses to this form of pricing,
when three di¤erent sellers o¤ered three di¤erent products for sale and consumers
2 See Rebecca Mead, the New Yorker, March 21, 2005, for other details. Cabral (2000, p.185)
also mentions a restaurant in London that does not list prices in the menu; and each customer is
asked to pay what he or she thinks the meal was worth. Recently, many cafes and restaurant in
the US have also adopted this practice.
3 As reported by Kim et al., Lynn (1990) argues that some customers in a restaurant pay more
to avoid the impression of looking cheap.
4 The restaurant owner in the eld study also decided to keep this PWYL format in the long
run because of positive feedback from the guests (see Kim et al. p.55).
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could choose any price they like to pay, including zero. Although there was a
wide distribution of payments by consumers, surprisingly no one did free ride all
consumers paid a positive price. Based on the study, the authors conclude that a
consumers willingness to pay depends mainly on two factors: (i) an internal reference
price for each consumer; and (ii) a proportion of consumer surplus a consumer is
willing to share with the seller. Based on the estimation results, the authors conclude
that the nal prices paid were inuenced by (a) fairness, (b) satisfaction, (c) market
price awareness, and (d) net income (p. 53).
In economic literature such pricing strategies are analyzed as problems of multi-
dimensional screening where information about willingness to pay is asymmetric [see
a comprehensive most recent review by Rochet and Stole (2003)]. From screening
considerations, PWYL pricing and bu¤et pricing (or at-fee pricing), represent two
polar extremes. In PWYL, the buyer decides how much to pay for a given quan-
tity. The opposite is the case in bu¤et pricing, where the buyer decides how much
to consume for a given xed fee.5 Under bu¤et pricing, in spite of consumers hav-
ing an option of unlimited amount of consumption, they do consume only a nite
amount. Similarly, under PWYL pricing, even with a free-ride option, not all buy-
ers free ride, as was the case with the Radiohead o¤er, and all consumers paid in
5 See Nahata, Ostaszewski and Sahoo (1999) and Sundararajan (2004) for other examples and
protability comparison with other linear and nonlinear usage-based pricing strategies.
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the above mentioned eld study. Indeed, in both types of pricing consumers freely
self-select quantity consumed in bu¤et pricing and the payment in PWYL option.
Two questions, most relevant for both theoretical and empirical analyses of
PWYL pricing are: What motivates consumers to pay when they have an op-
tion to free ride?6 And, recognizing the possibility that PWYL option may result in
losses, what motivates the seller in o¤ering such a pricing option?7 We provide some
answers to these questions based on a theoretical economic model.
Kim, Natter and Spann (2009) articulate quite elegantly the behavioral factors
that may dissuade consumers from free-riding. Based on the literature from psy-
chology, marketing, and experimental economics, they posit four factors a¤ecting
consumers decision to pay. The most common reason given in favor of paying, as
opposed to free riding, is social-norms, which has also been considered as one of the
reasons for tipping.8 The other factors that may dissuade free riding are: avoiding
6 On CNNs American Morning, John Roberts asked the question to the owner of the Java Street
Cafe in Kettering Ohio, who uses PWYL pricing: what prevents a customer to either free ride or
pay a very low price? The owner responded, ...When someones at the counter and you say, you
get to pay what you think is fair, very few people are going to take advantage of that situation.
(CNN March 17, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/03/017/lippert.quanda/#cnnSTCText
7 Wall Street Journal (August 28, 2007, p. B8) reports that the motivation for the owner of
Terra Bite Lounge in Kirkland, Washington for doing away with set prices was that PWYL pricing
can be both protable and charitable way of doing business. Further, marketing buzz such a
scheme generates can help stand out from the pack.
8 Tipping for services (e.g, taxi, waiter etc.) is not considered a social norm in Japan and hence
tipping is almost non-existent in Japan.
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the appearance of looking cheap; fairness, reciprocity; and altruism.9
The main focus of this paper is to demonstrate that the traditional framework
of utility maximization can provide theoretical support for most of the conclusions
reached by Kim et al. by considering behavioral factors. Our main assumption is
that a consumer maximizes utility over an innite time horizon. Our simple model
based on this assumption shows that not all consumers have the incentive to free
ride because free-riding threatens the survival of the rm, thus making the service
unavailable in future periods. This survival consideration is also mentioned in Kim
et al. (p.45), but not modelled. They also note that the survival consideration for a
smaller rm becomes even more important for consumers and hence, instead of free
riding, they tend to pay adequately. This, assumption does have empirical support
from the payments made to priests for religious services in Indian villages. If the
villagers in India did not pay, the services of the priest will not be available in future
periods. This survival consideration could also be the reason why the restaurant
in Fukuoka, Japan has survived for the past 30 years. We also extend our basic
theoretical model to include behavioral factors considered by Kim et al. and arrive
at similar results.
Why should a seller use pay-what-you-like pricing? We o¤er three possible rea-
9 Kim, Natter and Spann (2009) survey the literature quite extensively. To conserve space, we
avoid duplication and urge the interested readers to refer to their paper and the references included.
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sons. First, PWYL pricing practice results in savings because of a reduction in
pricing related transactions costs. For example, when savings from reduction in
transactions costs are large enough to o¤set the extra production cost, at fee be-
comes more protable compared to a two-part tari¤. Similarly, when the cost of
conducting market research to introduce a new product or setting prices for goods
and services are signicant (the cost of pricing is high), then the seller may let the
general public provide the information about willingness to pay at the lowest cost.
This is especially true for experiencegoods, such as music and culinary arts. In
the case of PWYL pricing, because the cost of setting prices is zero, it results in
savings from eliminating the pricing related transactions costs. Hence, PWYL pric-
ing strategies could be more protable than other commonly used pricing strategies,
such as a uniform pricing. Second for heterogeneous consumers under most usage-
based strategies, some consumers would be excluded from the market because the
market price exceeds their willingness to pay. Since consumers do not compete with
each other and choose how much to pay for the good or service themselves, no one
would be excluded because of higher price under PWYL pricing, making potential
market participation the highest. Third, for a risk-averse rm, such as small Mom-
and-Pop stores, the use of uniform pricing may not guarantee a normal prot. But,
we show that PWYL pricing not only guarantees positive revenue, but potentially
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higher prots than uniform pricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In § 2 we present our basic theoretical
model using game theoretic framework. Our rst proposition shows that if any
consumer has a positive valuation for the good, then all consumers free-riding is not
an equilibrium. In Proposition 2, we also show when paying a positive price becomes
a dominant strategy. § 3 derives conditions for a for a risk-neutral rm when PWYL
pricing is more protable than uniform pricing. When risk neutrality is replaced
by risk-aversion, PWYL pricing becomes even more attractive. We also derive the
condition when PWYL becomes more protable if price-setting is not costless. § 3
extends the model by including behavioral factors, namely, fairness, social norms,
reference price etc. The e¤ect of these variables is captured by introducing a social
cost for free riding or not paying a fair price.We show the expected result: as
the social cost of free riding increases the likelihood of free riding decreases. We
show that if the social cost is higher than consumers reference price, the consumer
is not likely to choose PWYL pricing and thus avoids incurring social cost by not
purchasing the good from the rm. Both these results are in conformity with the
empirical ndings of Kim et al., and § 5 concludes.
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2 Model
We begin with a simple game theoretical model based on (innitely) repeated interac-
tions between consumers and the rm to show that free-riding is not an equilibrium.
Later we extend the model to include behavioral factors similar to those mentioned
in Kim et al.
2.1 Consumers
For simplicity, assume there are only two heterogeneous consumers in the market,
N = 2 who receive a PWYL o¤er from a provider of an exclusive or a highly dif-
ferentiated good. Arguably the assumption of two consumers is rather restrictive,
however, our results based on this simple case provides a theoretical support for
many empirical results obtained by Kim et al., where several hundred consumers
were followed in the survey.
The utility function of consumer i in the current period is:
U(vi; pi) = vi   pi for i = 1; 2 (1)
where vi is consumers valuation for the good and pi  0 is the price paid by consumer
i, which she self-selects. Consumers are assumed to know both their value for the
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good and the other consumers value for the good.10 Unlike a at-fee pricing, we
assume that consumers maximize their life time utility subject to rms survival
conditional on the contributions of other consumers.11 We assume that the rm
incurs only xed cost, F (variable costs are assumed be zero). This assumption
is quite consistent with the observation by Kim et al. (p. 49), who suggest that
PWYL pricing is more suited for products (e.g., in their selection: a cinema hall and
a restaurant o¤ering bu¤et lunch) having a large xed cost and negligible variable
cost.
The rms xed cost of production is unknown to the consumers, but its distri-
bution G with support: F 2 0; F  is known and consumers have some estimate of
the expected cost in mind. For computational simplicity, we adopt the following
cumulative density function for the xed cost.12
G (x) =
p
x
F
for x  F
1 for x > F .
10The qualitative results continue to hold when consumers are uncertain about the valuations of
other consumers, but know the discrete distribution of valuations amoung the remaining consumers.
11 Under at fee consumers maximize their utility only during a limited time period set by the
seller, for example, a lunch bu¤et during some set hours. In PWYL pricing the consumers value
the good period after period and want the seller to continue providing the good over innite time
periods. Because of this consideration, and such considerations are stronger for small Mom-and-Pop
stores, the consumers pay. If the owner is not compensated,adequately the services they value
in the future may not be available.
12 G is assumed to have all the common properties of a CDF:G 2 [0; 1] ; G0 > 0; andG00 < 0:
Our qualitative results hold for other specications also.
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Because both consumers are innitely lived in this game, they face the same
choices each period t,
Wi(v; pit; pjt) = maxfpig11
" 1X
t=0
t Pr(t (pit; pjt) > 0)U(v; pit+1).
#
The lifetime utility function can be represented by the following Bellman equation:
Wi(v; pi; pj) = max
pi

U(v; pi) +  Pr(t (pi; pj) > 0)W
 
v; p0i; p
0
j

(2)
where (0) indicates values in the next period, 0   < 1 is the discount factor, pjt is
the other consumers contribution (price), and W () is an unknown value function.13
The value function used here is similar to those used in the analysis of worker e¤ort
[see Sparks (1986)]. The probability that the rm is protable is equal to the
probability that the sum of consumer contributions is greater than the rms xed
cost, Pr ( > 0) = Pr (pit + pjt > F ) = G (pit + pjt).
In this game, the consumers must choose between two potential actions: to free
ride or to contribute.
13 Given the assumptions about the discount factor, , and the distribution of xed cost, G (),
the value function satises the quasi-concavity constraint that allows us to nd a xed point in a
functional form.
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2.1.1 Free-rider
The rst solution is based on the free-rider strategy. Equation (2) can be re-written
such that W (v; pit; pjt) =W (v; 0; pjt) =W FRi
W FRi =
vi
1  G (pj) . (3)
Note consumer is value of free riding increases as the contributions made by the
other consumer increases.
2.1.2 Consumers contribute
The second solution pertains to the situation when consumers are willing to con-
tribute. A consumer prefers paying a positive price when W > W FR: Given the
assumption that consumers are innitely lived, the value function, W (), can now be
treated as an unknown parameter. A consumers optimal price is found by solving
the following rst-order condition with respect to (2):
@W
@p
=  1 + W
2F

pi + pj
F
 1=2
= 0 =) pi = F

W
2F
2
  pj: (4)
The marginal cost of contributing is  1, while the marginal benet is W
2F
 pi+pj
F
 1=2
.
A consumer is willing to contribute $1 to the survival of the rm as long as the
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present discounted future return in the form of utility ows is greater than $1. Note,
the equilibrium price pi increases with both W and ; but decreases as xed cost
F increases. The value function, W represents future utility ows. Therefore,
a consumer should be more willing to contribute as her valuation increases. The
discount factor, ; captures a consumers trade-o¤ between consumption today and
consumption in future periods. As the discount factor increases the cost of waiting
decreases and consumers are more willing to invest in the rms survival. As F
increases the rms survival probability decreases thereby decreasing the returns of
consumer contributions; ceteris paribus.
The value function is solved by rst solving for price from the rst order condition
and substituting this result into equation (2) : The value function is dependent on
the level of contributions made by other consumers in the following manner
W (vi; pj) = 2[1 
q
1  (pj + vi) =], (5)
where  = F
2
is a constant capturing the contribution that maximizes the free riders
utility.14 The valuation function is increasing in both the valuation of the good and
the contributions made by the other consumers. The reaction function in price is
14 Details of derivation of this and all subsequent expressions are available from authors upon
request.
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found by substituting (5) into (4)
pi (pj) = 

1 
q
1  (pj + vi) =
2
  pj; (6)
which is increasing in the valuation of the good and decreasing in the amount con-
tributed by other consumers. Consumer contributions are viewed as strategic sub-
stitutes when (pj+vi)

< 3
4
and strategic compliments when (pj+vi)

> 3
4
. The amount
contributed by consumer i when consumer j free rides is pi (0) = 

1 p1  vi=2.
Under the PWYL option, the most a consumer is willing to pay is F  the amount
that insures rms survival. Any larger amount only increases the expected prots
but does not increase the survival probability of the rm.
2.2 Equilibria
In this section we characterize all price equilibria. Let vi > vj. There are four cases to
consider: (i) neither consumer contributes; (ii) consumer i contributes and consumer
j free rides; (iii) consumer j contributes and consumer i free rides; or (iv) both
consumers contribute.
All Free Ride. When neither consumer contributes, the product is only o¤ered
in the rst period and each consumer receives the single-period value of the good,
W FRi = vi and W
FR
j = vj:
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Proposition 1. For two heterogeneous consumers case, if for at least one consumer
the valuation v is greater than zero, then free riding is never an equilibrium.
Proof. To show that free riding is not optimal for both consumers, it is su¢ cient
to show that at least one consumer is willing to contribute (pi > 0) when the other
free rides. If consumer j is a free rider, then consumer i maximizes her utility by
choosing max [ W (vi; 0) ; vi] : Given these conditions, we solve for the level of vi such
that consumer i contributes a positive price
W (vi; 0) > vi =) 2

1 
p
1  vi=

> vi
=)   vi
2
2
> 0.
Since v is non-negative, and  > 0 by construction,
 
vi
2
2
> 0 is always true. The
intuition behind this result stems form a simple investment model. A consumer is
willing to invest in a bond when the present discount value of the bonds payout is
greater than the initial investment. In the pay-what-you-likecase, a consumer is
willing to contribute to the rm if the discounted present value of future utility ows
exceeds the initial contribution amount.
One or both consumers contribute
There are three possibilities to consider.
Consumer i contributing and j free riding. For this case, consumer i pays pi =
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

1 p1  vi=2 and receives utilityW (vi; 0) = 21 p1  vi= : Consumer
j free rides and gets utility equal to
W FR (vj; vi) =
vjp
1  vi=
. (7)
Note, the free-rider amount is increasing in both consumer js value vj; and consumer
is value, vi:
Consumer j contributing and i free riding. This case is symmetric to the case
above, so the utility derived in this case for each consumer is found by switching vi
and vj in the contribution value function,W (vj; 0), and the free-rider value function,
W FR (vi; vj).
Both contributing. The Nash equilibrium to equation (6) gives the equilibrium
contribution amounts. The intersection of the reaction functions gives the following
closed form solution
pi = min

max

0;
[4+3(vi 2vj)= 2
p
4 3(vi+vj)=]
9

,F

(8)
where the equilibrium price pi increases both in the valuation of the good vi, and
: The di¤erence in contribution amounts is exactly equal to the di¤erence in the
valuations of the good, pi pj = vi vj. Consumer is value function for contributing
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equals
W  (vi; vj) =
2[1 
q
5 3(vi+vj)= 2
p
4 3(vi+vj)=]
3
: (9)
Note, both consumers receive the same amount of utility, but consumer i contributes
more towards the good than consumer j:
The normal-form game below summarizes the utilities under each case.
consumer j
consumer i pj > 0 pj = 0
pi > 0 W
 (vi; vj) ;W  (vj; vi) W (vi; 0) ;W FR (vj; vi)
pi = 0 W
FR (vi; vj) ;W (vj; 0) vi; vj
The equilibrium outcome is dependent on both the relative di¤erence in consumer
valuations, v = vi   vj, and the magnitude of each individual value v.
Proposition 2 states the necessary bounds on a consumers value, v when one or
both consumers contributing is an equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If a consumers value, vi is greater than vi =  4

1  vj= 
p
1  vj=

then an equilibrium in pure strategies exists such that : (i) [vi > vi; vj < vj], consumer
i has a dominant strategy to contribute and consumer j free-rides; (ii) [vi < vi; vj > vj],
consumer j has a dominant strategy to contribute and consumer i free-rides; (iii) [vi > vi; vj > vj],
both consumers contribute; and (iv) [vi < vi; vj < vj], a mix-strategy equilibrium ex-
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ists.
Proof. Consider the case where both consumers contribute versus consumer i free
riding, W (vi; pj) > W FR (vi; vj) : Note, W (vi; pj) > W (vi; 0) because the likeli-
hood of the rm surviving in the next period increases with contributions made by
consumer j holding contributions made by consumer i constant. Therefore, it is suf-
cient to show that for some vi consumer i prefers to contribute and have consumer
j free ride than vice-versa W (vi; 0) > W FR (vi; vj). This condition holds when
vi >  4

1  vj= 
q
1  vj=

= vi (vj)
and contributing becomes a dominant strategy for consumer i. At rst, this result
may appear puzzling as to why one person would prefer to pay and have the other
consumer free ride than visa versa. Consider two people enjoying a meal at a
restaurant. If the low-value consumer contributes, she would make a contribution
level that may not maximize the utility of high-value person even with the high
person free riding. The lower contribution decreases the likelihood of survival of the
rm thereby decreasing the high value consumers free riding utility. In these cases,
the high-value consumer may consider choosing to pay for the meal and allow the
low-value consumer to free ride. Both parties are made better o¤ in this situation
leading to a Pareto-improvement and the rm receives more revenue.
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The functions vi (vj) and vj (vi) provide bounds on consumersaction set. Con-
sumer i has a dominant strategy to contribute a positive price when her value
is greater than vi (vj). The functions vi and vj intersect at (0; 0) ;
 
24
25
; 16
25


; 
16
25
; 24
25


; and
 
8
9
; 8
9


. These points of intersection provide the necessary bounds
of consumer values, satisfying each of the four possible cases.
Figure 1: Three Possible Equilibria
The white area represents the values of (vi; vj) where both consumers contribute.
The gray area represents the area where one players has a dominant strategy to
contribute. The hatched area represents the values of (vi; vj) where neither player
has a dominant strategy, but a mix strategy exists. Let i be the probability
consumer i contributes. The mixed strategy equilibrium for consumer i, i; is given
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by the equation (10).15
i =
W (vj; 0)  vj
W FR (vj; vi) W (vj; vi) +W (vj; 0)  vj . (10)
In reference to Figure 1, consumer heterogeneity in values plays an important role
in determining who contributes.As consumers become more alike, i.e., vi is closer
to vj; it is more likely to observe consumers randomly choosing when to contribute
following the mixed strategy outcome. As consumers become more heterogenous,
vi is farther from vj; it becomes more likely that one consumer always pays and the
other always free rides.
3 Prot
This section compares the protability of PWYL pricing with uniform pricing, thus
extending the empirical analysis of Kim et al. by evaluating prot incentive for
PWYL option. Although what happens to prots was not the focus of their eld
study, the owner of the delicatessen inferred a positive impact on prots under
PWYL. Our results provides support to the inference made by the owner.
Assume consumersvalues are drawn from a uniform distribution with the support
15Consumer js mixed strategy is symmetric to consumer is strategy and by symmetry we can
write, j =
W (vi;0) vi
WFR(vi;vj) W (vi;pj)+W (vi;0) vi
20
[0; v]. For a risk-neutral rm, the optimal uniform price per consumer is v
2
and the
total expected prot u = v
2
  F , where F is the xed cost. Under PWYL option,
the minimum revenue the rm receives is:
pi =
8>><>>:

h
1 p1  vi=i2 for vi  F (2 )
F for vi >
F (2 )

9>>=>>; , (11)
because free riding for both players is never an equilibrium (Proposition 1) and
consumers are not willing to pay more than F when their valuation vi >
F (2 )

= bv.
Thus, the rm is guaranteed a positive revenue when vi > 0 and the prot is
PWY L = min

F ; 
h
1 
p
1  vi=
i2
  F . (12)
From the two prot functions one can determine when PWY L > u.
Consider when one consumer values the product by more than bv, i.e., v > vi >
bv > v
2
: For this case, not only is PWYL more protable, but the rm earns at least
normal prot, PWY L = F   F  0:
Next consider the case when a single consumer cannot guarantee a positive prot,
v > bv > vi. In this case, PWYL pricing provides higher expected prots, PWY L >
u, when 
h
1 p1  vi=i2 > v2 or vi >  v2 +p2v : The probability of this
event is Pr

vi >  v2 +
p
2v

= max
h
3
2
 
q
2
v
; 0
i
and is greater than zero when
21
v  8
9
: This is a lower bound that assumes only one consumer pays. The probability
will increase when both consumers contribute.
3.1 Price-setting not costless
So far, it is assumed that the cost of setting price by the rm is zero. However,
Wernerfelt (2008) questions this commonly held assumption in most economic mod-
els that the act of price setting is costless and makes persuasive arguments in support
of price-setting being costly. In reality, price-setting incurs various types of costs ,
for example, costs related to collecting information about a consumers willingness to
pay through market research. Let m be the associated cost of all transactions related
to setting a particular price. When a seller uses PWYL pricing, the sellers cost of
price setting is zero or negligible because consumers set prices for themselves. Again,
PWYL pricing results in higher expected prots when PWY L > u  m: Therefore
one would expect prots under PWYL pricing to be higher when consumers valu-
ation vi > 
q
v
2
  m


2 
q
v
2
  m


= v: Further, the lower bound on consumer
valuation v decreases as the cost of pricing increases, @v
@m
< 0. Intuitively, this sug-
gests that PWYL pricing becomes more attractive as the transaction cost associated
with pricing increases.
A second probable reason for higher prots may be due to risk aversion. Under
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uniform pricing, there exists a positive probability that the rm does not receive any
revenue. A risk averse rm (e.g., Mom-and-Pop stores) would be more likely to
set a price below v
2
to reduce the probability of not receiving any revenue. Under
PWYL pricing, the rm is insured a positive revenue as long as v > 0: Therefore,
if the commonly used assumption of risk neutrality is replaced with the assumption
of risk aversion, then PWYL pricing becomes even more attractive to smaller rms
than facing a gamble under uniform pricing.
4 Fairness, Social Cost and Reference Price
One would expect, and Kim et al. provide empirical support, that reference prices
a¤ect how much a consumer would pay, when she pays. We introduce a reference
price in our model by considering two rms: Firm 1 sets the market (reference) price
that a consumer is familiar with; and Firm 2 uses PWYL pricing.16 The two rms
are located at the two endpoints of a linear city and each consumer is familiar with
both rms.17 A consumer may choose to purchase the good from either rm or decide
16 We consider the reference price to be the same as market equilibrium price, however we recog-
nize that the reference price could vary for each consumer depending on factors such as location,
information etc. We allow the variation in the reference prices by considering the di¤erence between
Pr and Pi .
17 This framework is similar to Hotellings model for analyzing horizontal di¤erentiation. This
also allows us to capture the role of exclusiveness of the product, or other forms of di¤erentiation.
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not to consume the good at all. If a consumer chooses not to consume her utility is
zero. Otherwise, consumer is utility function depends on the rm from which she
purchases the good. If she purchases the good from the price setting rm, then her
utility function is
Ui1 = v   tx2i   Pr (13)
where v is her valuation of the good, t is the per unit transportation cost, x is the
consumers current location on the linear city, and Pr is the reference or the market
price.
For the rm using PWYL pricing, in addition to a reference price, behavioral
factors such as guilt-feeling from breaking with social norms, fairness, looking
cheap etc., are also included. These behavioral factors are similar to those mentioned
by Kim et al. We capture the e¤ect of these behavioral factors by introducing a
catch all social cost parameter . Now, a consumers utility under PWYL pricing is
a function of the reference price, Pr, and the social cost parameter , such that
UiPWY L = v   t (1  xi)2   pi| {z }
Consumer Surplus
  
h
Pr pi
Pr
i
| {z }
Social cost
, (14)
where L (; Pr; pi) = 
h
Pr pi
Pr
i
is a function capturing the degree of social cost of not
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paying a fair price.18 Note, when the price pi is equal to the reference price, Pr; the
good is purchased guilt free or without incurring any social cost. When a consumer
free-rides, pi = 0, she incurs the highest social cost 
Consumer i prefers PWYL pricing when UiPWY L   Ui1 > 0 or the consumers
relative utility is given by
U (Pr; pi) = Pr   pi   t (1  2xi)  
h
Pr pi
Pr
i
, (15)
where the single period consumer surplus of free riding is U (Pr; 0) = Pr t (1  2xi) 
:
As in the previous section, consumer behavior is determined by a dynamic model
based on contributions by the consumers together with the consideration of rms sur-
vival. The following two period Bellman equation summarizes the dynamic model.
W (Pr; pi; pj) = U (Pr; pi) + 
 pi+pj
F
1=2
W
 
P 0r; p
0
i; p
0
j

, (16)
Two equilibria when consumers contribute are derived. The rst equilibrium is the
free rider outcome. In this case, consumer is contribution is set to zero, pi = 0:
18 This function can be interpreted as an index of social cost similar to the Lerner Index of
monopoly power.
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The value function reduces to an geometric series having the well know solution
W FR (Pr; 0; pj) =
U(Pr;0)
1 (pj=F)1=2
, (17)
where W FR (Pr; 0; pj) is increasing in both contributions by consumer j and the
discount factor , but it is decreasing as the social cost  increases. In the absence
of contributions made by consumer j, the dynamic model collapses to a one-shot
static outcome of U (Pr; 0) and the PWYL rm fails.
The second equilibrium is an interior solution to the consumers objective func-
tion. The rst order condition with respect to consumer is level of contribution
is
@W (Pr;pi;pj)
@pi
=  1 + 
Pr
+
W(P 0r;p0i;p0j)
2F
 pi+pj
F
 1=2
= 0
where the marginal cost of contributing, 1   
Pr
; is decreasing with the social cost,
; but increasing with respect to the reference price, and the marginal benet of
contributing to the survival of the rm is
W(P 0r;p0i;p0j)
2F
 pi+pj
F
 1=2
. The optimal con-
tribution level and value function are solved using similar methods as those previously
described in the basic model. The consumer value function is equal to
W (Pr; pi; pj) =
2Pr
Pr   
"
1 
s
1 

Pr (i   )
Pr    + pj

=
#
(18)
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where  = F=2 and i =  t (1  2xi) : The value function that includes fairness
consideration reduces to the baseline case when  = 0 and i is interpreted the same
as vi in the previous model. Consumer is contribution level can be expressed as
a function of consumer js contributions by substituting the optimal value function,
W (Pr; pi; pj) ; into equation (4.6). The reaction function in contribution levels is
given by
pi (pj) = 
"
1 
s
1 

Pr (i   )
Pr    + pj

=
#2
  pj, (19)
where contributions are strictly increasing with the reference price, @pi
Pr
> 0 and
consumer is relative value, i: The strategic interaction between consumers is de-
pendent on the levels of contributions. The marginal e¤ect of an increase in the
contribution made by consumer j on consumer is contribution is
@pi
@pj
=  2 + 1p
1 [pj+Pr(i )=(Pr )]=
,
which is positive (strategic compliments) when pj > 34   Pr(i )Pr  and negative other-
wise (strategic substitutes). Contributions made by consumer j above this threshold
provides an incentive to consumer i to contribute the necessary funds that insures
the rms survival. A marginal increase in the social cost of fairness, ; increases the
optimal contribution if a consumers value for the good is higher than the reference
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price, i > Pr; else contributions decrease as the social cost increases. If consumer
j does not contribute, then consumer is optimal contribution is
pi (0) = 
"
1 
s
1  Pr (i   )
 (Pr   )
#2
and consumer js free rider utility is
W FR
 
j; i

=
Pr + j   q
1  Pr(i )
(Pr )
The reaction function for consumer j is symmetric to that of consumer i.
The Nash equilibrium in contributions is the point of intersection of the two
reactions functions. At this point, the optimal contribution level for consumer i is
pi = max
240; [4+ 3PrPr (i 2j+)= 2
r
4  3Pr
Pr (i+j 2)=]
9
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and the di¤erence in contribution levels between consumers is proportional to each
consumers value for the good, pi   pj = Pr(i j)Pr  : The lifetime utility of consumer i
when both consumers contribute is found by replacing pj in equation (18) with the
28
Nash equilibrium contributions.
W 
 
i; j

=
2Pr[1 
s
5  3Pr
Pr (i+j 2)= 2
r
4  3Pr
Pr (i+j 2)=]
3(Pr )
The normal-form game in the presence of "fairness" is summarized in the table below.
consumer j
consumer i pj > 0 pj = 0
pi > 0 W
  i; j ;W   j; i W (i; 0) ;W FR  j; i
pi = 0 W
FR
 
i; j

;W
 
j; 0

Pi + i   ; Pi + j   
The equilibrium outcome is dependent on the relative di¤erence in consumers values,
 = i   j, the social cost parameter, ; and the reference price, Pr:
Proposition 3 states the necessary bounds on a consumers relative value,  when
one or both consumers contributing is an equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If a consumers value, i is greater than i
 
j

; wherei
 
j

is the value of i such that W (i; 0) = W
FR
 
i; j

; then an equilibrium in pure
strategies exists such that : (i)

i > i; j < j

, consumer i has a dominant strategy
to contribute and consumer j free-rides; (ii)

i < i; j > j

, consumer j has a
dominant strategy to contribute and consumer i free-rides; (iii)

i > i; j > j

,
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both consumers contribute; and (iv)

i < i; j < j

, a mixed-strategy equilibrium
exists. The mixed-strategy equilibrium for consumer i, i; is given by the equation
(20)19.
i =
W
 
j; 0
   Pr + j   
W FR
 
j; i
 W  j; i+W  j; 0   Pr + j    . (20)
The inclusion of social cost provides some interesting insights. First, consumers
are only willing to free ride when Pr + i    > 0 or xi > t Pr+2t : As the lump sum
social cost increases, fewer consumers are willing to free ride, but the participation
constraint becomes less binding as the reference price increases. Second, consumers
are only willing to contribute if and only if both Pr >  and i > : If the social cost
exceeds the products value, i < ; then consumers are better o¤ by not opting for
the PWYL pricing. If the reference price is less than the social cost, i.e., Pr < , then
consumers can avoid the social cost by purchasing the good from the price-setting
rm at price Pr. Only those consumers located at t Pr+2t < xi <
t+2
2t
are willing to
free ride and not contribute. The introduction of social cost could e¤ectively price
some consumers out of the market. This result parallels the traditional result where
when a consumerss reservation price is lower the market price, the consumer does
not enter the market. Here a reference price lower than social cost discourages the
19 Proof is similar to other Propositions and to conserve space is not included, it is available
upon request.
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consumer to participate in pay-what-you-like o¤er.
4.1 Duopoly. Competition
We now attempt to answer the question: When could PWYL pricing be protable?
We assumed that for PWYL to work, the good should be di¤erentiated. Most of the
examples given earlier (e.g., Radiohead, the village priest, the exclusive restaurant in
Japan etc.) support the conjecture that product di¤erentiation plays a very impor-
tant role for PWYL pricing to be protable. Below we show the importance of the
exclusivenessof the product.
We incorporate degree of di¤erentiation by using a traditional duopoly model,
where one rm uses Bertrand pricing and compare price (and prot) with the other
rm that uses PWYL pricing. In the traditional Bertrand model with two rms
located at the either end of a linear city (measuring the degree of horizontal product
di¤erentiation), the demand for rm 1, located at x1 = 0 is given by D1 (p1; p2) =
p2 p1+t
2t

and the prot function is
1 = p1D1 (p1; p2)  F = p1

p2   p1 + t
2t

  F
where F is the rms realized xed cost. The reaction functions in prices can be
found by solving the rst-order condition, p1 =
p2+t
2
. Firm 2s reaction function is
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symmetric to that of rm 1. The Nash equilibrium in prices results in a market price
equal to the transportation cost, p = t: In equilibrium, both rms earn the same
prot, 1 = 2 =  = t2   F:
Under PWYL pricing, one rm is a price setter (Firm 1) and the other rm
(Firm 2) uses PWYL pricing. For a price-setting rm 1, the captive consumers are
those consumers who are unwilling to free ride by going to the rm o¤ering the good
using PWYL pricing. Demand for the price-setting rm is D1 (p1; ) =

 p1+t
2t

:
Consumers located at xi >
 p1+t
2t
will prefer to purchase the good from the PWYL
rm. Firm 1s prot function is
1 = p1

  p1 + t
2t

  F .
The rst order condition
@1
@p1
=

  p1 + t
2t
  p1
2t

= 0
gives the equilibrium price as p1 = +t2 . The equilibrium price increases with the
social cost and can be higher than the traditional outcome when  > t: However,
if  > t; then no consumer is willing to contribute to the PWYL rm (Proposition
3), Firm 2 is better o¤ competing in prices, and the equilibrium price becomes
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the traditional duopoly result of p = t: In order for PWYL pricing to exist, the
product must be su¢ ciently di¤erentiated to overcome any social cost stigma,  < t:
Intuitively, this result implies that PWYL pricing would be more successful in sectors
where products are more di¤erentiated (or have fewer substitutes) such as music and
specialty foods, but would fail in sectors where the service or product is homogenous
(or has many close substitutes) such as gasoline:
5 Conclusions
The main contribution of the paper is that our simple model provides a theoretical
economic framework that captures both the seller and consumers behavior under pay-
what-you-like option. Our results support the empirical ndings of Kim et al. We
show that in equilibrium even without accounting for social cost, not all consumers
free ride as was observed in the case of Radiohead and many other places. Our results
show that all consumers contributing is also an equilibrium as observed by Kim et
al. Our extended model that incorporates social cost resulting from not paying a
fair market price shows that when a consumer does take into account the social
cost of free riding and when this cost is su¢ ciently high, then consumer may not
participate under pay-what-you-like pricing and whether a consumer chooses to pay,
free ride or not to participate at all depends on the size of the social cost.
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Under certain conditions, for a risk neutral rm, PWYL pricing could be more
protable than uniform pricing and hence there is an incentive for the rm to use
this pricing. For risk averse rms this incentive becomes even stronger. Additionally,
this form of pricing becomes more attractive from a prot standpoint when savings
resulting from eliminating costs related to price setting, especially when the cost of
setting a price is large.
Finally, using a simple duopoly model, we show that if the good or the seller of
the good is not su¢ ciently di¤erentiated (e.g., art, music or artist or a musician,
etc.) then pay-what-you-like pricing is not suited and the rm should compete
in prices with other rms. But, when it su¢ ciently di¤erentiated it facilitates a
voluntary segmentation based on consumersself selection thus making a rst-degree
price discrimination feasible, but without incurring the cost such practice generally
requires.
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